Corporate governance by Hutchinson, Marion
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUT Digital Repository:  
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/ 
Dellaportas, Steven and Gibson, Kathy and Alagiah, Ratnam and Hutchinson, Marion R. 
and Van Homrigh, David and Leung, Philomena (2005) Corporate Governance. In: 
Ethics, Corporate Governance and Accountability. John Wiley and Sons, Milton, Qld., 
pp. 117-150. 
 
          © Copyright 2005 John Wiley & Sons 
Ethics, Corporate Governance and Accountability Chapter 5 Corporate Governance 0 
 
Chapter 5 ...................................................................................................................2 
Author: Dr Marion Hutchinson .................................................................................2 
Learning Objectives.....................................................................................................2 
A Introduction..............................................................................................................3 
A Corporate governance .............................................................................................4 
B The parties to corporate governance .....................................................................9 
B The principles of corporate governance...............................................................12 
<C> 1. Lay solid foundations for management and oversight................................14 
<C> 2. Structure the board to add value ................................................................14 
<C> 3. Promote ethical and responsible decision-making .....................................14 
<C> 4. Safeguard integrity in financial reporting ..................................................15 
<C> 5. Make timely and balanced disclosure.........................................................15 
<C> 6. Respect the rights of shareholders..............................................................15 
<C> 7. Recognise and manage risk ........................................................................15 
<C> 8. Encourage enhanced performance .............................................................15 
<C> 9. Remunerate fairly and responsibly .............................................................16 
<C> 10. Recognise the legitimate interests of stakeholders ...................................16 
B Culture and values................................................................................................16 
A The tools, mechanisms and means to affect corporate governance .....................17 
B  The evolution of cooperate governance  controls ...............................................18 
B. External corporate governance controls.............................................................21 
B. Internal corporate governance controls..............................................................23 
C  Monitoring by the board of directors..................................................................24 
C Remuneration .......................................................................................................28 
D Performance-based remuneration ...................................................................30 
E Management share ownership..........................................................................31 
E Shares options ..................................................................................................32 
A  The role of the accountant in the governance of the entity ...............................34 
A Corporate governance and firm performance ....................................................38 
B  Board composition and firm performance ..........................................................38 
B  Remuneration and firm performance ..................................................................39 
C Compensation and firm performance...............................................................39 
C Share-ownership and firm performance ..........................................................40 
C Share options and firm performance................................................................40 
A. Does corporate governance work? ......................................................................41 
Key terms....................................................................................................................42 
Further resources.......................................................................................................45 
Case study...................................................................................................................46 
The strength of the efficient market hypothesis......................................................48 
The board's capacity to protect the integrity of financial disclosure – effective 
board monitoring. ......................................................................................................49 
Tradeoffs in the use of stock options in executive compensation because of the 
potential of risk-preferring management ................................................................50 
Poor fit between stock-based employee compensation and retirement planning 51 
Appendix A: Best practice disclosure recommendations from the ASX ..............54 
Disclosure ................................................................................................................54 
References:..................................................................................................................57 
Glossary ......................................................................................................................58 
 
 
Ethics, Corporate Governance and Accountability Chapter 5 Corporate Governance 1 
 
 
 
 
Ethics, Corporate Governance and Accountability Chapter 5 Corporate Governance 2 
 
Chapter 5 
Corporate Governance 
 
Author: Dr Marion Hutchinson 
 
Learning Objectives 
After studying this chapter you should be able to: 
• Describe corporate governance 
• Identify the parties to effective corporate governance 
• Identify and describe the principles of effective corporate governance 
• Explain the importance of culture and values for good corporate governance 
• Explain why corporate governance principles are put into practice 
• Describe the role of the board of directors 
• Discuss the usefulness of remuneration packages in aligning the goals of 
shareholders and managers. 
• Explain the role of equity remuneration 
• Identify and discuss the role of the accountant in the governance of the 
organization 
• Discuss the relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance 
 
 “Public confidence is essential to effective capital markets - and 
this need for confidence is not limited to the companies listed on 
the exchange.  It must also be reflected in the processes by which 
the capital market and the wider corporate environment is 
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monitored and regulated……Increased disclosure whether it be 
through the recommendations, legislation or business’s own 
initiative is intended to help investors and other information users 
understand and compare business performance - so they can be 
more informed in their decisions on who to punish and reward.” 
Greg Larson, CEO of CPA Australia (2003) 
 
 
A Introduction 
Governance is largely about the decision-making process in a complex organization 
Shareholders (owners) delegate authority to professionals who have the managerial 
skills to increase shareholders’ wealth. As a consequence the contributors of a firm's 
capital base are usually different from the contributors of its management base.  This 
separation of ownership from control has led to organizations establishing a system of 
corporate governance controls designed to discourage managers from pursuing 
objectives that fail to maximize shareholder wealth.  These controls constitute the 
firm's corporate governance framework. Corporate governance controls are designed 
to monitor managers behavior or align the goals of management with the goals of 
shareholders. 
 
In this chapter, a corporate governance framework is developed that outlines the roles 
and responsibilities of participants involved in governing the organization and 
portraying information to the capital market.   
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A Corporate governance  
Corporate governance refers to the method by which an organization is governed, 
administered, directed or controlled and to the goals for which it is governed.   
Various participants, who have an interest in the organization, determine the direction 
and the performance of the organization.  The principle participants are the 
shareholders, management, and the board of directors.  As shareholders do not 
manage most large corporations, managers of the firm are given considerable degrees 
of decision-making authority.  That is, the principal (shareholder) delegates decision 
rights to the agent (manager) to act in the principal’s best interests.  This separation of 
ownership from control implies a loss of effective control by shareholders over 
managerial decisions that affect the value of their wealth.   Problems arise if the 
managers who initiate and execute decisions also approve and monitor the decisions 
without constraints on their actions as managers can pursue their own interests rather 
than those of the owners.  Consequently, managers can divert potential profits to 
satisfy their own interests.  This action reduces stockholders’ gains while raising the 
managers' total compensation.   
 
As a result of the separation of ownership from control, a system of corporate 
governance controls are implemented on behalf of the shareholder to discourage 
managers from pursuing objectives that fail to maximize shareholder wealth.  These 
controls constitute the firm's corporate governance framework. The various corporate 
controls either assist in aligning the incentives of managers with those of shareholders 
or limit the self-satisfying opportunities managers can generate.   These opportunities 
are referred to as agency costs, that is, the costs incurred by the firm which are 
associated with such problems as divergent management and shareholder objectives 
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and information asymmetry, where the manager has private information about the 
firm.  For example, the cost of monitoring the agents (managers) behaviour could be 
the audit fees associated with ensuring the financial reports depict a true and fair view 
of the firm’s performance and financial position.   Corporate governance controls 
refer to internal and external controls designed to accord manager-shareholder 
(agency) conflicts of interest, that result from the separation of ownership and control 
(Williamson, 1984).  These corporate governance controls are used to: monitor 
outcomes are in accordance with plans, that is the firm is attaining planned objectives 
such as increased profitability; and to motivate the organisation to be fully informed 
in order to maintain or alter the organisational activity, that is, the organization is 
familiar with, and understands, managements’ future strategies. 
 
In recent years there has been considerable interest in the corporate governance 
practices of modern corporations, particularly due to the high-profile corporate 
collapses of firms such as Enron and WorldCom in the USA and the HIH Insurance 
Group and One Tel in Australia.  The result of these corporate collapses impacts on 
the economy at large, not only the direct stakeholders of the organizations such as 
employees, shareholders and creditors.  For instance, insurance premiums rise when a 
major insurance provider vanishes from the market and confidence in the efficient 
management of the remaining organizations also declines (see In practice box below).   
 
In Practice: The failure of HIH Insurance 
The collapse of HIH made professional indemnity, public liability, home warranty 
and travel insurance policies worthless, placed retirees and disabled people on social 
security, led to building industry insurance instability, and escalated public liability 
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insurance.  Around one thousand employees became unemployed immediately, while 
hundreds of others lost their jobs in the following months.  The ramifications of the 
collapse were far reaching and resulted in public loss of confidence in the insurance 
industry.  Mr Justin Neville Owen, Royal Commissioner, suggests that the failure of 
HIH was due to the firm not providing adequately for future claims – under-reserving 
or under-provisioning. This situation arose because the firm was mismanaged and 
failed to uphold many of the basic corporate governance principles. Ill-informed and 
extravagant business acquisitions, questionable business transactions, lack of attention 
to detail and lack of accountability of the CEO to the board of directors all made the 
corporate collapse inevitable.  Poor business decisions included re-entering the US 
insurance market in 1996, expanding the UK operations in 1997 into areas in which 
HIH was unfamiliar, and the acquisition of the already failing FAI Insurance Ltd in 
1998.  The final doomed business decision was to sell off HIH’s profitable businesses 
to enter a joint venture with Allianz Australia Ltd in 2000.  The resulting negative 
cash flows led to the decision to place the company in provisional liquidation in 
March 2001.   
Source: information from HIH Royal Commission (2003) The Failure of HIH 
Insurance: A Corporate Collapse and its Lessons, (Mr Justice Neville Owen 
(commissioner), 3 vols, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 
 
However, good corporate governance should be promoted without stifling 
entrepreneurial drive or impairing competitiveness.  Management should have the 
freedom to drive the company forward, within a framework of effective accountability 
(Hermraj 2002). 
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The essential components of organizations’ corporate governance are the parties 
involved in governing the entity, the principles of the governance framework, the 
culture and values of the organization to support the governance principles and the 
tools, or mechanisms, used to apply the governance principles.  The following table is 
adapted from the CPA Australia Corporate Governance Task Group discussion paper. 
 
Table 5.1 Some essential components of corporate governance 
Component Examples 
The parties (people with a role to play in 
the effective governance of the firm) 
• Governing body 
• CEO 
• Board of directors 
• Management 
• Shareholders 
• Other stakeholders (e.g. customers, 
suppliers, employees, lenders and the 
community) 
The principles (a framework of effective 
governance) 
• Being a good corporate citizen 
(developing a code of ethics and code 
of conduct) 
• Robust, regular performance 
reporting, monitoring, review and 
evaluation (using a monitoring 
system, Board assessment, CEO 
reviews, measuring corporate 
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performance) 
• Robust compliance and risk 
management processes 
• Independent review and verification 
(through internal audit, external audit, 
peer reviews, audit committees, board 
independence, remuneration 
committees) 
Culture and values that are supportive of 
effective governance 
• Honesty 
• Trust and integrity 
• Openness 
• Performance orientation 
• Responsibility and accountability 
• Mutual respect 
• Commitment to the organisation 
The tools, or mechanisms and means, to 
apply effective governance principles, 
suitable for the organisation 
• Codes  
• Charters 
• Committees 
• Delegations 
• Policies and procedures 
• Key performance indicators (KPIs) 
etc. 
Source: adapted from information from Emerging Issues Work Group (2003) ‘The 
essence of corporate governance’, CPA Australia Corporate Governance Task Group, 
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www.cpaaustralia.com.au/01_information_centre/1_0_0_0_home.asp, accessed 29 
September 2003. 
 
B The parties to corporate governance 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (January 23 2002) arose following a succession of high 
profile corporate collapses in the US.  The Act was designed to review dated 
legislative audit requirements.  The goal of the act was to protect investors by 
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures.  The act covers such 
things as establishing a public company accounting oversight board, auditor 
independence, corporate responsibility, and enhanced financial disclosure.  The 
Australian counterpart to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Federal Government’s CLERP 
9 amendments to the Corporations Act was released in September 2002.  CLERP 9 
proposes three bodies to represent a range of interests; the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) to oversee standard setting for audit and accounting, the Australian 
Stock Exchange’s (ASX) Corporate Governance Council to oversee the development 
of best practice guidelines for corporate governance within listed companies and the 
Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council (SIAC) to provide a forum for the 
consideration of retail investors’ concerns. 
 
The professional accounting bodies, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Australia and CPA Australia (among others), commented on the draft of CLERP 9.  It 
was the responsibility of these bodies to determine whether the legislation was 
sufficient to promote efficient corporate governance, and financial reporting and 
assurance.  CPA Australia suggested that the legislation should build a framework 
that identifies auditors’ conduct and practices but it should also include boards of 
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directors, staff who prepare financial reports, the internal and external audit functions, 
and include the roles of institutional investors, credit rating agencies, financial 
analysts and investment banks. 
 
Contrary to the US experience, the CLERP 9 legislation’s response to reviewing audit 
responsibilities, states, “most audits are conducted professionally and competently, 
with full regard given the interests of shareholders, the need for independence and 
professional ethics.”   The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia believe that 
the vast majority of audits are carried out this way and suggest that the corporate 
governance, financial reporting and auditing issues that led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
are not evident in the Australian market. 
 
The parties involved in the effective governance of the organization include the 
governing body (e.g. Australian Securities and Investment Commission, Australian 
Stock Exchange, Corporate Governance Council, Australian Taxation Office, 
Australian Competition and Consumers Commission), the CEO, the board of 
directors, management, shareholders and other stakeholders of the organization.  
Other stakeholders include customers, suppliers, employees, lenders, and the 
community at large. 
 
It is the responsibility of the board of directors to formulate the organization’s 
strategy, to develop policy, to appoint, supervise and remunerate senior executives 
and to ensure accountability of the organization to the owners. The board of directors 
is a governance mechanism designed to monitor the performance of the organization 
on behalf of the owners. This aspect is covered in more detail in section 5.3. 
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Shareholders are the owners of the entity, to whom the directors are accountable.  
Under the Corporations Act 2001 (Commonwealth) and the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) Listing Rules, shareholders have the authority to sanction corporate 
transactions, appoint directors to supervise management and provide strategic 
direction, and to sanction other significant acts of listed companies reserved to 
shareholders.  Shareholders rely on continuous disclosure to facilitate informed 
trading, and exercise the rights given to them, which they exercise at general 
meetings.  However, shareholders participation at general meetings may be impeded 
because they do not have a clear understanding of the business to be conducted at the 
meeting or the time and cost involved in attending the meeting.  As a consequence of 
these impediments, shareholders place greater reliance on the efficient governance of 
the corporation.  For example, shareholders unable to attend the general meeting are 
dependant on managers making decisions that will increase their wealth. 
 
Stakeholders (in addition to shareholders) have an interest in the effective 
performance of the organization.  This interest can be direct or indirect.  Customers, 
suppliers, employees, and lenders have a direct interest in the organization to which 
they buy from, supply to, or are employed by.  Employees may have a greater stake in 
the organization than shareholders as their current and future income depends on the 
current and future performance of the organization.  As a consequence, the 
organization has an obligation to safeguard their employees through the ethical and 
efficient governance of the organization.  Organizations must ensure that customers’ 
interests are maintained to guarantee the future viability of the organization.  Without 
customers the organization will no longer exist.  Suppliers of goods and services or 
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funds (lenders) have invested their assets in the organization and expect a return.  
Organizations can only guarantee that return if they continue to operate efficiently in 
the future.  Effective corporate governance is a means of providing that guarantee. 
 
B The principles of corporate governance 
In March 2003 the ASX Corporate Governance Council (CGC) set out to develop 
an industry-wide corporate governance framework.  It consists of 21 representatives 
of interested groups (shown in table 5.2).   
 
Table 5.2 Corporate Governance Council representatives 
• Association of Superannuation Funds of 
Australia Ltd 
• Group of 100 
• Australasian Investor Relations 
Association 
• Institute of Actuaries of Australia 
• Australian Council of Superannuation 
Investors 
• Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in Australia 
• Australian Institute of Company 
Directors 
• Institute of Internal Auditors 
Australia 
• Australian Institute of Superannuation 
Trustees 
• International Banks and Securities 
Association of Australia 
• Australian Shareholders’ Association • Investment and Financial Services 
Association 
• Australian Stock Exchange Limited • Law Council of Australia 
• Business Council of Australia • National Institute of Accountants 
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• Chartered Secretaries Australia • Property Council of Australia 
• CPA Australia • Securities and Derivatives Industry 
Association 
 • Securities Institute of Australia 
Source: ASX Corporate Governance Council (2003) Principles of good corporate 
governance and best practice recommendations, March 2003, Australian Stock 
Exchange, Sydney, p. 4. 
 
The CGC suggests that fundamental to good corporate governance is company 
management and a board with a mix of skills, experience, independence and the 
integrity necessary for ethical decision-making.  The company must be accountable to 
attract capital investment, and should therefore meet the information needs of the 
investment community in a manner that upholds and recognises shareholders’ rights.   
 
The CGC recommends 10 essential corporate governance principles, covering such 
issues as developing guidelines for: the appropriate mix of executive and non-
executive directors; the independence of non-executive directors; the oversight of the 
preparation of the entity’s financial statements, internal controls, and the 
independence of the entity’s auditors; the review of the compensation arrangements 
for the chief executive officer and other senior executives; the way in which 
individuals are nominated for positions on the board; the resources that are made 
available to directors in carrying out their duties; and the oversight and management 
of risk.  The principles in the framework presented in Table 5.1 of the CPA Australia 
corporate governance discussion paper are similar to the CGC’s principles.  However, 
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as the CGC’s principles are guidelines for all listed companies to adhere to, these 
principles are discussed in the following section of the chapter. 
 
<C> 1. Lay solid foundations for management and oversight 
Organisations should clarify and make publicly known the roles and responsibilities 
of board and management to provide shareholders with a level of accountability. 
Boards should provide strategic guidance and oversee management. The division of 
roles and responsibilities between the board and management should provide a 
balance of authority so that absolute power does not rest with any single individual. 
 
<C> 2. Structure the board to add value 
The board needs a range of skills and understanding, be of sufficient size and have an 
appropriate level of commitment to fulfill its responsibilities and duties. The board 
must be able to deal with various business issues and have the ability to review and 
challenge management performance. The board should be made up of a majority of 
independent directors, have an independent chairperson, and key roles such as 
chairperson and chief executive officer should not be shared. 
 
<C> 3. Promote ethical and responsible decision-making 
Organisations should develop a code of conduct for their directors and executives that 
promote ethical and responsible decision-making. Organisations should also publish 
its position on trading in company shares and associated products by members of the 
board and employees.  
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<C> 4. Safeguard integrity in financial reporting 
Organisations should implement procedures to independently verify and safeguard the 
integrity of the company’s financial reporting. This can be achieved through the 
formation of an audit committee and use of the skilled, independent external auditors. 
 
<C> 5. Make timely and balanced disclosure 
Organisations should develop written policies and procedures that promote the timely 
and balanced disclosure of all material matters that concern it. These policies and 
procedures should ensure that all investors have access to timely information and that 
the organisation’s announcements are clear, factual and balanced.  
 
<C> 6. Respect the rights of shareholders 
Organisations should respect the rights of shareholders and help shareholders exercise 
those rights. Organisations can help shareholders exercise their right by effectively 
communicating information that is understandable and accessible to shareholders and 
encouraging shareholders to participate in general meetings. 
 
<C> 7. Recognise and manage risk 
Organisations should establish a system of risk oversight and management and 
internal control. Organisations should be continually identifying, assessing, 
monitoring and managing risk, and informing investors of changes to risk. 
 
<C> 8. Encourage enhanced performance 
Organisations should review and actively encourage enhanced board and management 
effectiveness. Organisations can facilitate this by providing directors and executives 
with the information required to assess the company’s performance. 
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<C> 9. Remunerate fairly and responsibly 
Organisations should ensure that remuneration is sufficient and reasonable and that 
the relationship between remuneration and performance is clear. Organisations should 
ensure that they are adequately remunerating directors and employees to attract those 
with the necessary skills to enhance company performance. 
 
<C> 10. Recognise the legitimate interests of stakeholders 
Organisations should recognise that they have legal and other obligations to all 
legitimate stakeholders, such as customers, suppliers, employees, lenders and the 
community. Organisations should recognise the value added to the company by 
natural, human, social and other forms of capital. 
 
 
B Culture and values 
For stakeholders to have confidence in the organisation, key elements of the 
organisations’ culture and values must support good corporate governance principles. 
The key elements include honesty, trust and integrity, openness, performance 
orientation, responsibility and accountability, mutual respect, and commitment to the 
organisation.   
 
Fundamental to good corporate governance is the way the directors and management 
develop a model of governance that aligns the values of the corporate participants and 
then test this model periodically for its effectiveness.  In particular, senior executives 
should conduct themselves honestly and ethically, particularly concerning actual or 
apparent conflict of interest, and disclosure in financial reports.  Establishing a culture 
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where employees feel confident to report violations will ensure that the key elements 
of trust and integrity, openness, responsibility and accountability, mutual respect, will 
be upheld.  The HIH case provides and example of organisational culture that failed to 
meet these fundamental elements.  The CEO/founder continued to run the business as 
his own even to the point where company funds were used to pay for personal tax 
advice of senior executives and executive directors.   
 
Corporate participants share common goals that shape our policy goals and guide our 
approach to finding solutions to governance issues. For instance, if the auditor and 
management share the goal of financial reporting transparency for the investing 
public, problems relating to failing to disclose relevant information such as related 
party transactions, will not arise.  This means that investors can have confidence in 
the information flowing into the market that fulfils the goal of financial reporting 
transparency.  To ensure effective corporate governance, all participants in the market 
system must share the goal that financial reporting should provide useful and reliable 
information that promotes informed investment decisions and confidence in the 
capital market system. 
 
 
A The tools, mechanisms and means to affect corporate governance 
 
Financial management and financial reporting are essential to manage and 
communicate the financial position of the firm at a particular time.  There is the 
potential for the integrity of the result to be compromised through intent or omission 
to disclose particular information.  There have been a number of corporate collapses, 
such as HIH, OneTel, World Corp and Enron, where the corporate governance 
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practices of the company or the absence of an appropriate governance policy has led 
to information failing to reach the investor.  With more than 50% of adult Australians 
holding shares both directly or indirectly (due to compulsory superannuation), 
shareholders are no longer a select group and corporate governance responsibilities 
are far reaching.  James McRitchie (2001) poses the following questions:  Who 
controls these assets? Who executes voting rights?  How do the workers benefit?  
Good corporate governance practices are important in determining the cost of capital 
in a market economy. 
 
B  The evolution of cooperate governance  controls 
Managers of publicly listed organisations have more information than investors about 
the current and future financial performance of the organisation.  This information 
asymmetry causes agency problems of moral hazard and adverse selection.  Moral 
hazard arises when the manager does not comply with the contractual terms.  Moral 
hazard arises after capital is raised because management has incentives to use the 
capital for their own interests rather than those of the shareholder.  Managers will 
adopt financing policies and a capital structure for the firm, which can help to secure 
their jobs.  For instance, instead of investing in a new, potentially path-breaking 
product, technology, or market, a manager may choose the less risky route of 
expanding an existing product line that uses known technologies and sells in known 
markets. Although such a conservative strategy rarely produces large returns, it 
reduces the chance of a firm-threatening, manager-threatening failure. Forgoing 
potentially very profitable projects reduces the expected wealth of stockholders but 
enhances the expected wealth of managers.  Adverse selection occurs when an 
inappropriate decision is made by the principal, given the information available to the 
principal (eg selecting managers with inappropriate skills for the required task).  
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Adverse selection can also occur because managers are concerned with promoting the 
sale of the firm’s shares to investors and may overstate the benefits of buying the 
shares.  Unless the manager can credibly signal the value of the firm, investors will 
reduce the amount they are willing to pay.    
 
Governance controls are designed to eliminate the hazard that managers will not exert 
maximum effort on the behalf of shareholders, or consume the benefits of the capital 
raised through excessive abuse of privileges .  The inefficiencies that arise from moral 
hazard and adverse selection can be reduced by either monitoring managers’ 
behaviour or designing compensation contracts that link managers’ performance to 
the performance of the firm.  For example, to monitor managers behaviour, an 
independent third party attests the accuracy of information provided by management 
to investors.  Thus, the independent auditor assures public investors that financial 
reporting provides useful and reliable information that portrays the economic realities 
of the business. 
 
An ideal control system should regulate both motivation and ability.  Corporate 
governance refers to internal and external controls designed to accord 
manager/shareholder conflict of interest that result from the separation of ownership 
and control.  Internal corporate governance controls monitor activities and the take 
corrective action to accomplish organisational goals.  Examples of internal controls 
include monitoring managers by the board of directors, remuneration committees, 
audit committees and incentives designed to align managers and shareholders 
interests.   External corporate governance controls encompass the controls external 
stakeholders exercise over the organisation.  Examples of external controls include 
Ethics, Corporate Governance and Accountability Chapter 5 Corporate Governance 20 
 
debt covenants, external auditors and government regulations, that place restrictions 
on management behaviour or monitor their actions. 
 
With the significant increase in equity holdings of institutional investors in many 
corporations, there has been an opportunity for a reversal of the separation of 
ownership and control problems because ownership was not so diffuse.  However, the 
problems have continued.  As institutional shareholders are not privy to the private 
knowledge of managers, they cannot be aware of all the financial and investment 
opportunities that can be accepted or rejected by management.  Hence, the need for 
corporate governance mechanisms persists.  The ‘In practice’ box below explains that 
investors are willing to pay more for shares in companies they consider to be well 
governed. 
 
In practice: Investors willing to pay for well-governed companies 
Coombes and Watson (2000) in three surveys of corporate governance found that 
investors are willing to pay more for shares of well-governed companies.  They 
defined a well-governed company as one with a majority of outside directors with no 
management ties to the board, undertakes formal evaluation of directors, and is 
responsive to investors requests for information on governance issues.  Directors 
should have significant share holdings in the company and a large proportion of their 
pay should be in the form of share options.  The three surveys of over 200 
institutional investors in Asia, Europe and USA and Latin America demonstrated that 
75% of investors consider board practice to be at least as important as financial 
performance.  The premium they were prepared to pay for well-governed companies 
was a function of the quality of financial reporting in the country where accounting 
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standards are perceived to be higher.  The premium investors were willing to pay for a 
well-governed company in the UK or the USA was 18% compared to 22% premium 
for a well-governed company in Italy and 27% for and Indonesian well-governed 
company. 
 
B. External corporate governance controls 
One example of an external corporate governance control is the Australian Stock 
Exchange listing rule 4.10.3, which requires listed companies to set out in their annual 
reports a statement of the main corporate governance practices in place. The statement 
should disclose:  
... the extent to which the entity has followed the best practice recommendations set by 
the ASX Corporate Governance Council during the reporting period. If the entity has 
not followed all of the recommendations the entity must identify those 
recommendations that have not been followed and give reasons for not following 
them. If a recommendation had been followed for only part of the period, the entity 
must state the period during which it had been followed. 
Source: ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3 
 
The guidelines set out in the listing rule are voluntary only to the extent that listed 
companies can adopt alternative practices provided they explain why they did not 
adopt the ASX guideline.  However, investors and information users will ultimately 
determine whether the adopted alternative practices are acceptable, by investing or not 
investing in the firm.   
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As mentioned, the principles and recommendations for corporate governance are 
guidelines.  The ASX does not stipulate required practices, preferring to state that 
particular governance mechanisms may not be appropriate for all companies and in 
some cases may impose unwarranted costs on some listed companies: 
 
How to approach adoption of the best practice recommendations 
The best practice recommendations are not prescriptions. They are guidelines, 
designed to produce an efficiency, quality or integrity outcome. This document does 
not require a “one size fits all” approach to corporate governance. Instead, it states 
aspirations of best practice for optimising corporate performance and accountability in 
the interests of shareholders and the broader economy. If a company considers that a 
recommendation is inappropriate to its particular circumstances, it has the flexibility 
not to adopt it – a flexibility tempered by the requirement to explain why. 
 
Companies are encouraged to use the guidance provided by this document as a focus 
for re-examining their corporate governance practices and to determine whether and 
to what extent the company may benefit from a change in approach, having regard to 
the company’s particular circumstances. There is little value in a checklist approach to 
corporate governance that does not focus on the particular needs, strengths and 
weaknesses of the company. 
 
The Council recognises that the range in size and diversity of companies is significant 
and that smaller companies may face particular issues in attaining all 
recommendations from the outset. Performance and effectiveness can be 
compromised by material change that is not managed sensibly. Where a company is 
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considering widespread structural changes in order to meet best practice, the company 
is encouraged to prioritise its needs and to set and disclose best practice goals against 
an indicative timeframe for meeting them. 
 
See Appendix A in this chapter for best practice disclosure recommendations of the 
ASX. 
 Source: ASX Guidance Note 9A, p. 5. 
 
The report on the failure of the HIH Insurance Group by Royal Commission tabled in 
April 2003 provides support for the CGC’s recommendations that one size does not fit 
all regarding good corporate governance practice (Allens Arthur Robinson 2003).  
The Royal Commissioner Mr Justice Neville Owen stated that “By its very nature 
corporate governance is not something which ‘one size fits all’.  Even with companies 
within a class, such as publicly listed companies, their capital base, risk profile, 
corporate history, business activity and management and personnel arrangements 
will be varied.”(Allens Arthur Robinson 2003, p. 2) 
 
B. Internal corporate governance controls 
Internal governance controls are designed to monitor the behaviour of managers and 
provide incentives to align managers’ and shareholders’ interests.  Monitoring by the 
board of directors and compensation contracts represent two of the many governance 
controls available to organisations. 
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C  Monitoring by the board of directors 
Shareholders grant decision control rights to the board of directors.  The decisions of 
managers are monitored and ratified by the board of directors.   Shareholders and 
boards monitor and evaluate managers' actions over time enforcing their ideals on 
managers of how and what should be achieved.  This involves considerable 
monitoring of actions, direction and intervention and may be very costly and may not 
totally eliminate information asymmetries.   
 
The board of directors, with its legal authority to hire, fire and compensate top 
management, safeguards invested capital, and is therefore an important element of 
corporate governance.   Directors have certain legal obligations to the shareholders 
and they can be held liable for damages if they fail to meet these obligations.  As a 
consequence, directors will have some desire to maintain or establish reputations as 
good monitors and competent business people.  The ultimate responsibility for full 
and fair disclosure to shareholders, and the direct responsibility for the independent 
audit relationship and the quality of the audit is with the board of directors and the 
audit committee.  Regulators have suggested that the members of the internal audit 
committee, responsible for overseeing and liaising with the external independent 
auditor, should be non-executive directors.  This recommendation implies that non-
executive directors are better monitors of the auditor. 
 
Researchers have investigated the usefulness of a board of directors as a monitoring 
device as they communicate the shareholders' objectives and interests to managers.  
Increased independent board members (non-executive directors) are likely to promote 
decisions that are in the interests of external shareholders.  The board’s capacity to 
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monitor is jeopardized if internal members (executives of the corporation or others 
affiliated with management) dominate the board.   
 
The CGC in Principle 2 suggests that the board should consist of a majority of 
independent directors.  The criteria for board independence in Principle 2 states that a 
director is independent if they meet all of the following: 
•The director is not a member of management. 
•The director is not a substantial shareholder of the entity or an officer of or otherwise 
associated directly or indirectly with a substantial shareholder of the entity. 
•The director has not within the last three years been employed in an executive 
capacity by the entity or another group member or been a director after ceasing to 
hold any such employment. 
•The director is not a principal of a professional adviser to the entity or another group 
member.  
•The director is not a significant supplier or customer of the entity or another group 
member, or an officer of, or otherwise associated directly or indirectly with a 
significant supplier or customer. 
•The director has no significant contractual relationship with the entity or another 
group member other than as a director of the entity. 
•The director is free from any interest and any business or other relationship which 
could, or could reasonably be perceived to, materially interfere with the director’s 
ability to act in the best interests of the entity. 
Source: ASX, Guidance Note 9, p. 4 
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The board, in a broader perspective, is devised to limit management and shareholder 
conflict.  In particular, managers receive pecuniary incentives to maximize firm value 
from share ownership, share option plans, and adjustments in salary based on 
performance.  A board of directors is the primary internal corporate governance 
mechanism responsible for, among other duties, setting management compensation 
and monitoring senior management.  An effective compensation contract provides 
executives with an incentive to act in the shareholders’ best interests.  This means that 
the link between pay and corporate performance should be greater in firms with non-
executive director dominated boards and remuneration committees.  In addition to 
compensation monitoring, regular board meetings allow potential problems to be 
identified, discussed and avoided and should therefore lead to a superior level of 
performance. 
 
The combination of incentives for performance and monitoring by the board provide 
the governance control system for top management.  However, different board 
structures are optimal for different firms, for the simple reason that each firm faces its 
own management problems, and hence finds their own solution. Forcing companies to 
have a particular board structure (e.g. non-executive vs. executive directors) could be 
to the detriment of shareholders by compelling them to adopt board structures that are 
sub-optimal for their firms.  
 
It is therefore likely that in some circumstances it may be more efficient to have a 
board composed primarily of executive (inside) directors. The ability of the board to 
monitor the firm’s executives is a function of its access to information.  Executive 
directors possess superior knowledge of the decision making process and therefore 
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evaluate top management on the basis of the quality of decisions that lead to financial 
performance outcomes, ex ante. In contrast, non-executive directors evaluate 
managers on the basis of financial performance measures ex post. Therefore, it could 
be argued that executive directors look beyond the financial criteria. 
 
Even with a majority of non-executive directors on the board, the board functions on 
information provided by the CEO.  The CEO can also play a principal role in 
determining the remuneration and tenure of non-executive directors.  In addition, 
dispersion of ownership and increased powers of senior management have 
accompanied the evolution of the corporate system. This can result in a decline in the 
accountability of directors and management, resulting in a similar decline in the 
monitoring role of boards.  Hence, these factors can have the effect of weakening the 
board as a crucial instrument of corporate governance.  The ‘In practice’ box below 
suggests that the HIH collapse was affected by these factors. 
 
In Practice: The failure of board of directors of HIH Insurance 
Poor strategic decision-making was accompanied by blind faith in an ill-equipped 
leadership, insufficient independence and unidentified and mismanaged risks.  At the 
board level there was little analysis of the future strategy of the company.  For 
example, the rationale behind the re-entry into the US market and the expansion in the 
UK market was never discussed or approved by the board.  The founder and CEO of 
HIH, Raymond Williams, did not clearly express the details of his strategy for the 
company.  It is one of the board’s key responsibilities to understand, test and endorse 
the company’s strategy; otherwise they will not appreciate the associated risks.  The 
board should measure performance against the company’s strategic goal. 
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There were no clear limits placed on the authority of the CEO with regard to 
investments, corporate donations, gifts and staff compensation and the board rarely if 
ever rejected or changed a proposal put forward by management.  Decisions about the 
performance and remuneration of senior officers were made by the CEO who attended 
all human resource committee meetings (by invitation).  
 
The chairman of the board was ineffective, failing to guide the board to focus the their 
attention on conflict of interest resolution or related party disclosures. The chairman 
did not deal with the non-executive directors’ concerns about the governance 
procedures of HIH.  The agenda for each board meeting was prepared by the company 
secretary, approved by the chairman and commented on by the CEO.  No other board 
members were involved.   Information was hidden, filtered or sanitised.  There were 
material omissions from information given to the board, even to the point where 
information was misleading.  
 
C Remuneration 
Pay for performance remuneration is useful when monitoring is costly, or impossible 
because the manager has private information about the firm’s operations or future 
investment opportunities.   Tying managers' compensation to shareholder's objectives, 
such as successful firm performance, is likely to motivate managers to behave in a 
manner consistent with shareholder's interests. 
 
Incentives, both compensation and equity, provide targets, such as financial results, 
for managers to achieve.  This type of control approximates a market contracting 
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arrangement, where the manager is free to select the method of achieving the desired 
result.  However, performance-based incentives transfer risk to the manager’s 
compensation.  In addition, such incentive schemes are reactive in the sense that it 
provides no mechanism for preventing mistakes or opportunistic behaviour and can 
elicit myopic behaviour.  For example a manager may focus attention on diversified 
acquisitions with the aim of increasing the share price and hence his/her 
compensation.  However, this approach is in conflict with the organization’s strategy 
if the organization’s competitive advantage is specialization. 
 
Firms may offer a range of incentives to their managers in an attempt to motivate 
effort and align the interests of managers with those of the shareholders.  Incentives 
offered by firms include cash-bonuses, perks, promotions, shares and share options.   
 
The Corporations Act requires annual disclosure by listed companies of the details of 
the nature and amount of each element of the fee or salary of each director and each 
of the 5 highest paid non-director executives.  The ASX CGC’s (2003, p. 52) 
recommended guidelines for disclosing remuneration include options such as: 
• Salary  
• Fees 
• Non-cash benefits  
• Bonuses accruing in respect of that year, regardless of payment date 
• Profit share accruing in respect of that year, regardless of payment date 
• Superannuation contributions 
• Other payments in relation to termination and retirement of office 
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• The value of shares issued and options granted, according to an established and 
recognized method of valuation 
• Sign-on payments  
 
The CGC suggests that the remuneration committee is comprised of a majority of 
non-executive directors. The responsibilities of this committee will vary among firms 
but the key functions are to review and recommend remuneration for the CEO and 
senior management.  The committee should obtain independent advice on current 
remuneration trends.  HIH Insurance fell well short of any such independence, as the 
CEO attend all the remuneration meetings. 
 
D Performance-based remuneration  
Performance-related compensation is designed to relate some proportion of salary to 
individual performance within the context of overall company performance. 
Performance based remuneration may be in the form of cash or non-cash payments 
such as shares and share options, superannuation or other benefits that are linked to 
the firm’s performance. Managers who do not maximize their performance level, and 
who do not act in the best interests of the shareholders, will suffer financially.  
Linking managerial reward to the price of a firm's shares alleviates the incentive 
problem of motivating management.  In addition, shareholders are able to utilize the 
information that is publicly available, the share price, to monitor management.  
Performance-based incentives may therefore be regarded as a means of reducing  
conflict between decision-makers and shareholders. 
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Thus, performance-related pay is influential in making the interests of managers 
consistent with those of the shareholders. The compensation system employed by a 
firm is an important part of the process of controlling both effort and reward and can 
ultimately affect the profitability of the organization. 
 
E Management share ownership 
Management share ownership can be an important source of incentives and power 
for managers as well as outside shareholders.  It typically bestows voting rights, 
which can give internal and external shareholders a voice in the governance of a 
corporation. Distribution of shares among these stakeholders can, therefore, have a 
significant impact on corporate actions that are dependent on shareholder voting.  As 
managers become shareholders, they have a direct interest in an increasing share 
price. Better operating performance is one way of achieving this objective.   
 
Two views are expressed regarding the impact of managerial share ownership on 
shareholder welfare.  The first view suggests that as managers have already invested 
their non-diversifiable human capital in the firm, increased share ownership transfers 
additional risk to managers (compensation) and can lead to risk avoiding behavior on 
the part of managers, which may not be in the interest of shareholders.   
 
The second view advocates share ownership as a means to align the interest of top 
managers with that of shareholders. That is, if managers own stock in a company they 
are less likely to take actions that are not in the interests of shareholders.  The more 
shares management owns, the stronger their motivation to work to raise the value of 
the firm's shares, which is what the external shareholders want.  Consequently share 
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ownership by board members and executives represents an alignment of goals with 
shareholders. When insiders own a significant portion of a firm's stock, they have a 
strong incentive to enhance its value and act in ways that are in shareholders' best 
interests. Management and board effectiveness depends in part on directors’ 
identification with the interests of a firm's stockholders.  
 
However, problems do not invariably decrease as share ownership by top 
management increases: large management ownership insulates management from 
other forces such as the threat of takeovers and the discipline of the board.  If 
managers own substantial shares they may have enough voting power to curb the 
influence of the market.  While share ownership can synchronize the interests of 
managers and external shareholders in some circumstances, conflicts in agendas and 
interests of the two groups can result in differences in voting patterns.  For example, 
when efficient corporate policy requires changes in asset and employment structure, 
management shareholders are interested not only in the value of their equity 
investment but also in their employment with the firm.  In contrast, external 
shareholders are normally interested only in their equity investment in the firm. As a 
consequence, mangers would prefer to maintain the status quo, avoiding risky 
investment opportunities, preferring to safeguard their employment, which may be to 
the detriment of the shareholders. 
   
E Shares options 
A share option is an agreement involving the sale or purchase of a share denoting 
equity in a company.  The employee call option is the promise by the company to sell 
the share to the employee at a specified strike price, which may be greater than or less 
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than the current market price.  The employee may decide to enforce the agreement 
and exercise the options, or let it expire unexercised.  Share options may be an 
efficient way of overcoming the interest divergence between managers and 
shareholders especially when the managerial reward is linked to the price of the firms' 
shares.  As share options allow the future purchase of stock at a fixed price they 
represent deferred remuneration that can be exercised at the manager’s discretion. 
Consequently, shares options act as an incentive given the probability that shares 
prices increase.  Share options have the potential to align executives’ goals with those 
of the shareholders and therefore represent an incentive for managers to adopt value-
increasing projects.  
 
The relationship between owned equity shares and owned share options demonstrate 
the compensation risk managers are subject to.  Share ownership gives the owners 
voting rights and a linear payoff that increases with their firms’ performance.   In 
contrast, share options grants recipients the rights to acquire equity at a future date 
with a convex payoff as they need not exercise the option if the share price has not 
increased.  Options are similar to shares except that they fully benefit from share price 
increases but do not incur losses if the share price falls below the exercise price.  
Therefore, options do not have the same risk bearing properties associated with share 
ownership.  As a consequence, managers who hold more options than shares are able 
to endure more firm risk, are more likely to invest in riskier assets and have less 
interest in hedging and managing the risk of the firm (Hutchinson 2003).  
 
Following the corporate collapses mentioned in this chapter, together with excessive 
option grants in the US, concern has arisen over the accounting treatment of share 
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options.  The issue raised is whether share options should be treated as an expense 
against profit.  Proponents of adopting the expense approach suggest that excluding 
options understates executives’ remuneration and provides the opportunity to 
overstate profits.  The major benefit being that expensing options increases 
transparency.  Opponents of the expense approach suggest that the valuation of 
executive share options is problematic for two reasons.  First, they are not traded, so 
there is no market valuation to observe.  Second, the features of executive share 
options are such that they bear little resemblance to options on stocks or securities in 
general.  It would be difficult to have an international comparable method of 
valuation, and values move in both directions in line with share values.  There is no 
mandate on expensing share options to date.  However, firms are required to report 
the number of options awarded to and/or held by directors. Some firms have also 
chosen to voluntarily report the strike price and exercise date of the options awarded. 
 
A  The role of the accountant in the governance of the entity 
Accountants, auditors and the corporate governance structure in which they operate, 
are the primary providers of information to capital market participants.   Therefore, 
directors of the company should be entitled to expect that management would prepare 
the financial information in compliance with statutory and ethical obligations and rely 
on auditors’ competence on their opinion of the truth, fairness and compliance of the 
reports.  But ultimately it is the directors who make the final decision about the 
accuracy of the reports on the financial state of the organisation.  The reliability of the 
accounts depends on the integrity of the information on which they are based.  
Without reliable financial information, the board and auditors are unable to assess the 
company’s financial position and performance and detect any deterioration over time. 
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One area of concern for accounting and auditing is where the accounting firm acts as 
both independent auditor and management consultant to the firm they are auditing.  
This in turn puts in doubt the integrity and quality of the financial reports, due to 
client pressure to appease management to do things like conceal bad news.  This loss 
of independence has led to the requests for firms to have an independent audit 
committee and mandatory rotation of the auditing firm every three years.  CLERP 9 
suggests that auditor independence can be strengthened: by restricting auditor client 
employment relations; mandatory audit partner rotation; disclosure of both audit and 
non-audit fees; and a statement in the annual reports on how the audit has not 
compromised audit independence.   
 
In addition to the CLERP guidelines, the ASX Corporate Governance Council 
recommends that organisations have an audit committee comprising of a majority of 
independent non-executive members to ensure the independence of the committee 
from management.  The audit committee is an essential component of effective 
corporate governance.  The role of the committee is to oversee the financial reports 
and the audit processes, such as reviewing the external auditor’s independence.  The 
major advantage of the audit committee is that the external auditor deals with the 
board through the audit committee and is therefore not subject to management 
pressure to comply with their wishes.  It is not compulsory to have an audit committee 
but companies are required to disclose the existence of one.  However, the majority of 
Australian companies do have audit committees.    
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The HIH Insurance and Enron collapses are examples of misleading financial 
reporting. Mr Justice Owen discussed several issues relating to financial reporting and 
assurance of HIH, including the interpretation of accounting standards, adoption of 
international standards and the need for the Australian Accounting Standards Board to 
provide timely advice on interpretation matters.  He emphasised the importance of the 
audit function for capital markets and the users of financial reports.   He suggested 
that role of the auditor requires independence equal to that of a judge to avoid bias in 
preparing the audit reports.  As the ‘In practice’ box below shows it would appear that 
the HIH audit breached these principles of due care and independence. 
 
In Practice: The failure of the accounts of HIH Insurance  
Accounting techniques were used to hide the full extent of the decline. The financial 
statements were distorted by questionable entries, heavy reliance on one-of end-of-
year transactions, and aggressive accounting practices.  For example, HIH incurred 
significant income tax losses in 1999 and 2000 but continued to record the full value 
of future income tax benefits as assets.  The relevant accounting standard states that 
where a company incurs an income tax loss, unless the future income tax benefits are 
certain, it is imprudent to record the future tax benefit as an asset. 
 
The HIH audit committee concentrated on the accounts and the numbers contained in 
them, failing to identify and assess the risk the company was exposed to.  An audit 
committee should be independent of management, consisting of non-executive 
directors.  However, all directors, both executive and non-executive directors,  
attended the HIH audit committee meeting.  The audit committee rarely if ever 
preferred the auditors’ opinion over managements’ opinion.  Although the auditors 
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had a formal system of quality control and procedures in place they relied on the 
valuations of HIH’s consulting actuary, when conducting its audit, thus breaching the 
independence of the auditors.  
 
In addition to the Australian experience, Enron in the US also provides an example of 
misleading financial information and lack of audit integrity and independence. 
 
In Practice: The failure of the accounts of Enron 
 
The Houston based energy trading company, Enron Corporation, filed for bankruptcy 
in 2001.  With $62.8 billion in assets, it became the largest bankruptcy in US history.   
The Powers report of February 2001 was a special investigative committee of the 
board of directors.  The committee suggested that reported transactions were designed 
to present favourable financial reports, rather than present a bona fide view of the 
company’s operations.  Enron concealed huge losses by creating illusions that a third 
party was contractually obligated to pay the amount of any losses, that is, their risks 
were hedged.  However, the third party was an entity in which Enron had a substantial 
economic stake.  The Andersen partner responsible for auditing Enron was considered 
to be a client pleaser.  Discussions of accounting practices inevitably led to the clients 
view prevailing.  Subsequently, Enron was successful in removing a member of the 
Andersen’s audit after he expressed his disapproval of many aspects of Enron. 
Source: Vinten, G. (2002) The corporate governance lessons of Enron, Corporate 
Governance, Vol.2, No.4, pp. 4-9. 
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These high-profile failures and the questionable performance of the key players in the 
financial reporting system place doubt on investors’ ability to rely on the oversight of 
the board of directors and independence of the audit committee.  Are the accounting 
and disclosure standards sufficiently transparent for investors and the public?  The 
range of topics covered by accounting standards has increased substantially 
throughout the years.  In 1980 there were nine accounting standards, by 1990 there 
were around 26 and by 2000 the number had increased to 43.  CLERP 9 recommends 
that accounting standards return to the dominance of the true and fair concept in 
financial reporting.  Business has had to improve the nature, volume and quality of 
information available to shareholders, in response to the loss of confidence facing the 
market.   
 
Can we rely on the self-regulatory corporate governance practices to guide 
management and ensure auditors efficiently perform their function?  If governance 
controls are efficient there should be a positive relationship between these controls 
and firm performance. 
 
A Corporate governance and firm performance 
Research investigating the relationship between corporate controls and firm 
performance has been mixed and often weak. The question is whether board 
monitoring and incentive contracts reduce owner-manager conflict. 
 
B  Board composition and firm performance 
Prior research has failed to arrive at a consensus regarding the relationship between 
board monitoring and firm performance.  For example, some researchers have only 
Ethics, Corporate Governance and Accountability Chapter 5 Corporate Governance 39 
 
found support for the relationship between frequency of meetings and profitability.   
Some researchers find a negative relationship between the proportion of external 
directors and firm performance while others found no relationship between external 
board membership and performance.  Therefore, it is likely that board composition is 
unlikely to have a direct impact on firm performance.   Rather, it is feasible that the 
relationship between board composition and firm performance is associated with the 
type of firm and supports the notion that one-size-does-NOT-fit-all.   
 
B  Remuneration and firm performance 
Incentives, both compensation and equity, are governance controls which provide 
targets, such as financial results, for managers to achieve.  The corporation’s objective 
is to construct an incentive contract that aligns the executive’s interests with those of 
the owner.   
 
 C Compensation and firm performance 
The result of previous research on the relationship between firm performance and 
CEO compensation have primarily been insignificant.  Researchers have argued that 
CEO’s will pursue their own interests rather than shareholders when their reward does 
not coincide with that of shareholders.  Subsequently, research has tested the 
sensitivity of CEO pay to changes in performance.  This argument suggests that an 
effective governance mechanism that aligns the goals of management with 
shareholders will be one where a change in shareholder wealth will lead to a 
significant change in CEO compensation.  However, prior research has failed to find 
consistent and significant relationships between executives’ remuneration and firm 
performance.  However, low average levels of pay-performance alignment do not 
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necessarily imply that this form of governance control is inefficient   Not all firms 
experience the same levels of conflict, and external and internal monitoring devices 
may be more effective for some than for others.   
 
C Share-ownership and firm performance 
 Share ownership can be an important source of incentives and power for executives 
as well as outside shareholders.  Distribution of stock among these stakeholders can, 
therefore, have a significant impact on corporate actions that are dependent on 
shareholder voting.  Some researchers have found that the largest CEO performance 
incentives came from ownership of the firm’s shares, while other researchers found 
that the relationship between share ownership and firm performance was dependent 
on the level of ownership. They found, at levels of ownership between five and 
twenty percent, profitability increases with ownership. At levels greater than 20% 
share ownership, profitability decreases with ownership. This result suggests that 
increases in ownership above 20% cause management to become more entrenched, 
and less interested in the welfare of their shareholders.  
 
C Share options and firm performance 
Research suggests that firm performance is positively associated with share option 
plans, suggesting that large pay-performance sensitivities were primarily the result of 
incentives provided by the executives’ ownership of shares and share options.  Share 
option plans direct managers’ energies and extend their decision horizons toward the 
long-term, rather than the short-term, performance of the company. 
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A. Does corporate governance work? 
Each firm’s governance needs vary with firm-specific and environmental conditions.  
From the discussion in this chapter it is evident that failures of corporate governance 
can be devastating.   Are the reforms to corporate governance that have arisen 
primarily from these corporate failures sufficient?  Can we rely on corporate 
governance processes, the oversight of boards and audit committees, to ensure that 
management and auditors carry out their responsibilities in an efficient and ethical 
manner? 
 
Good corporate governance does not necessarily lead to better firm performance; a 
positive relationship is likely to be dependent on the type of firm.  However from the 
evidence provided by the corporate collapses we have examined, bad corporate 
governance is more likely to lead to poor firm performance. Enron and WorldCom are 
cases where financial reporting was deliberately distorted with the objective of 
misleading investors and the public about the underlying economic performance of 
the firm. 
 
A Summary 
Fundamental to good corporate governance is a board of directors and management 
with a mix of skills, experience, independence and the integrity necessary for ethical 
decision-making.  The company must be accountable to attract capital investment, and 
should therefore meet the information needs of the investment community in a 
manner that upholds and recognises shareholders’ rights.   
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The essential components of organizations’ corporate governance are the parties 
involved in governing the entity, the principles of the governance framework, the 
culture and values of the organization to support the governance principles and the 
tools, or mechanisms, used to apply the governance principles.   
 
Shareholders rely on the information provided to the capital market to make decisions 
about their investments.  Accountants, auditors and the corporate governance structure 
in which they operate, are the primary providers of information to capital market 
participants.  The board of directors, as overseers of the company, should be entitled 
to expect that management would prepare the financial information in compliance 
with statutory and ethical obligations and rely on auditors’ competence on their 
opinion of the truth, fairness and compliance of the reports.  The importance of 
corporate governance is demonstrated in the fact that investors are prepared to pay 
more for a well-governed entity. 
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Questions 
1. Would the economic consequences of poor governance be greater for public or 
private companies? 
2.  From your experience, how would you define governance and its implications for 
companies? 
3. Describe the impact of good/bad corporate governance on stakeholders.  Refer to 
the areas of the principles of corporate governance which impact on stakeholders. 
4. How does shareholder/investor response to poor governance practices affect 
corporate financing? 
5. The Corporate Governance Council suggests that corporate governance practices 
cannot be prescriptive as a one size fits all approach may compromise firm 
performance.  Suggest some instances where imposing a particular governance 
practice may impede firm performance. 
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6. Describe the role of the board giving examples of the activities the board 
performs. 
7. What are the advantages and disadvantages of appointing non-executive directors 
on the board? 
8. To what extent should the board be concerned with the ethical conduct of the 
board and the company as a whole? 
9. Is it the role of the board to promote values and ethics within the company? If it is 
not the role of the board, whose role is it? 
10. Executives should be paid on the basis of their performance measures.  They 
should not be paid a salary.  Do you agree with this statement?  Explain your 
answer. 
11. What is the role of equity remuneration in efficient corporate governance? 
12.  What do you think would be the effect of expensing share options remuneration 
paid to executives or directors? 
13. Examine the corporate governance statement of an annual report.  (Eg, the website 
for Country Road is www.countryroad.com.au )  For the company you have 
chosen, answer the following.   
a) Do they comply with the CGC principles, in particular independent directors 
and shareholders’ rights? 
b) What guidance is provided by the CGC to address these issues? 
14. A director of the board has borrowed money from the company to invest in 
property speculation.  He plans to pay back the money when he has received the 
profit from the project.  Explain the implications of the director’s action and what, 
if any, disclosure is required. 
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15. Assume that the remuneration committee of Harvey Norman consults the firm for 
which you work.  The committee is interested in the different forms of 
compensation that can be offered to their executives to motivate them to maximise 
shareholder value. 
a) What types of compensation packages could be used and how would you 
recommend structuring the compensation to align executives and owners 
goals? 
b) What performance measure of the firm could the different forms of 
compensation be linked to? 
16. You are the executive director of a publicly listed firm Extrion Ltd, and you 
believe that an investment opportunity you have heard about will increase the 
profits of the firm.  The firm operates more like privately-owned businesses and 
does not have the same emphasis on rigorous corporate governance policies as 
recommended by the CGC. 
This investment opportunity requires funding which you have arranged through 
Merchant Securities, an investment firm.   You own 5% of the issued shares of 
Merchant Securities.  The board of directors is meeting next week to consider the 
future of Extrion Ltd.   
a) You know you have the best interests of the firm at heart.  What are your 
obligations as a member of the board, regarding the investment? 
b) What are your obligations regarding your shares in Merchant Securities? 
c) Do you see a conflict of interest, explain? 
 
Further resources 
ASX Corporate Governance Council website www.asx.com.au/corporategovernance  
Ethics, Corporate Governance and Accountability Chapter 5 Corporate Governance 46 
 
 
Journal articles  
Coles, J.W., McWilliams, V.B., Sen, N., 2001. An examination of the relationship of 
governance mechanisms to performance, Journal of Management 27, 23-50. 
Corporate Reform Law Economic Program; Report No. 9 released in September 2002 
Dalton, D.R., Dailey, C.M., Ellstrand, A.E., Johnson, J.L., 1998. Meta-analytic 
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Case study 
 
Corporate Governance and the collapse of Enron 
The failure of the Enron Corporation in 2001 was one of the largest corporate collapse 
in the history of the US. The collapse placed in doubt the effectiveness of 
contemporary accounting, auditing and corporate governance practices.   
 
The Chairman of the board, who was also the CEO, reassured investors that the 
company's core businesses and future earnings growth were stable, while at the same 
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time selling his shares and exercising options. In reality, write-offs against losses 
produced a loss of more than $600 million. This amount included a $35 million loss 
involving a conflict of interest where the company’s CFO managed the businesses in 
partnership with Enron.  Profits were overstated over a four-year period, primarily due 
to accounting manipulations.  Consumer confidence in the company fell along with 
the share price, and Enron finally filed for bankruptcy. 
 
The Powers report of February 2001 was a special investigative committee of the 
board of directors.  The committee suggested that reported transactions were designed 
to present favourable financial reports, rather than present a bona fide view of the 
company’s operations.  Enron concealed huge losses by creating illusions that a third 
party was contractually obligated to pay the amount of any losses, that is, their risks 
were hedged.  However, the third party was an entity in which Enron had a substantial 
economic stake.   
 
Enron raises the following problems associated with poor corporate governance: 
 The strength of the efficient market hypothesis 
 The board's capacity to protect the integrity of financial disclosure 
 Tradeoffs in the use of stock options in executive compensation because of 
the potential to motivate management to commit fraud and prefer risk  
 Poor fit between stock-based employee compensation and retirement 
planning 
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The strength of the efficient market hypothesis 
Enron's share price escalated at the same time as earnings fell demonstrating that 
markets sometimes ignore evidence about the finances of the firm.  Even if Enron 
actively misled the market about its true financial condition, the sophisticated market 
participants should have sufficient knowledge of the firm that the efficient market 
would devalue Enron's shares.  Enron's financial structure was highly complex with 
off-balance sheet entities that were obscured in Enron's disclosure documents.  The 
fact that it was difficult to determine Enron’s true financial position should be 
sufficient to send warning signals to the market, and the market should adjust the 
share price downwards.  
 
However, Enron's accountants at Arthur Andersen certified that the financial 
statements "fairly presented" the overall financial picture of the company.  But the 
credibility of Andersen's certification was compromised.  First, because it had 
permitted its independence to be undermined when the accounting firm cross-sold 
consulting services, such as tax planning and accounting planning, making the 
accountant part of the management team.  And second, because the internal 
governance of Andersen was insufficient to control the behaviour of its Houston 
partners, the partners responsible for the audit and consulting services supplied to 
Enron. 
 
Yet all of this is known to sophisticated investors and should have been impounded in 
Enron's share price.   So why was it that there was only a gradual fall in Enron’s share 
price?   
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The board's capacity to protect the integrity of financial disclosure – effective board 
monitoring. 
The monitoring role of the board is proposed as a remedy for a self-interested or 
incompetent managerial team. The major features are independent directors, 
specialized committees (in particular, an audit committee) consisting exclusively of 
independent directors to perform crucial monitoring functions, and a clear charter of 
board authority 
 
On the surface, Enron’s board fulfilled many of the corporate governance 
requirements.   Enron had an independent board with only two insiders of the fourteen 
directors and an audit committee to oversee the Company's reporting process and 
internal controls. The majority of the external directors had relevant business 
experience, including accounting backgrounds, prior senior management and board 
positions, and senior regulatory posts. Most of the directors owned stock and received 
stock options as part of the director compensation package. The Audit Committee’s 
had direct access to financial, legal, and other staff and consultants of the Company 
and the power to retain other accountants, lawyers, or consultants. However, the 
independence of virtually every board member, including Audit Committee members, 
was undermined by related-party payments and compromised by the ties associated 
with long service and familiarity. 
 
There was a gap between what the Enron board knew and could have/should have 
known.  Management effectively portrayed the Enron image of a well-managed firm.  
As a consequence the board did not question a proposal to suspend the corporate 
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ethics code, this suspension permitted conflict of interest transactions by a senior 
executive.   
 
Tradeoffs in the use of stock options in executive compensation because of the 
potential to motivate management to commit fraud and prefer risk 
At the time of the Enron collapse, the grant of a share option was not treated as an 
expense that reduces earnings, while the exercise of an option created an expense 
equal to the difference between the market price of the share and the exercise price of 
the option.  There is an incentive for option holders to increase the value of the option 
as they benefit from increases in firm value.  Stock options have value if exercised "in 
the money," that is, the stock price is above the exercise price. If option grants are 
very large and exercisable in the relatively near term, then a positive swing in the 
stock price can make the senior executives immediately very rich.  As option grants 
increased, the executives of Enron, were confronted with two incentives: fraud, and 
risk-taking.  Managers with an abundance of options have incentives to get the stock 
price high by any means necessary, fraud included. In particular, they may have 
incentives to increase the riskiness of the firm, including projects that offer volatile 
expected returns. This has the potential to increase the value of managers' firm-related 
investments and managers can become risk-preferring. Both fraud and costly risk-
taking appear to have occurred in Enron. Enron became a hedge fund, taking 
leveraged bets in exotic markets that if successful would produce a huge jackpot for 
its executives. 
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Poor fit between stock-based employee compensation and retirement planning 
The Enron case exposes the conflict between employee stock ownership, used for 
incentive purposes, with employee retirement planning. The actions of lower level 
employees are unlikely to have any impact on the share price.  For example, 
improving individual divisional performance is unlikely to influence the share price of 
a large corporation.  It is more likely that only senior management’s actions will 
impact on the stock price.  However, company shares can achieve organisational 
goals, such as economic decisions.  In addition, company shares can also serve as a 
form of profit-sharing that does not require a cash outlay by the company and which 
receives favourable accounting treatment.  
 
However, when shares are considered part of retirement planning it conflicts with the 
role of an incentive device. In the US, employee shares are typically placed into a 
contributory pension plan, for example, a 401(k) plan or an Employee Share 
Ownership Plan, which places strict limits on the employee's ability to sell the shares 
and tie up the proceeds until the employee's retirement. Thus the benefits of employee 
share ownership do not accrue until retirement. 
 
Enron employees were heavily invested in employer stock in their 401(k) plans. An 
estimated $1.3 billion of the plan's $2.1 billion in pension assets consisted of now-
worthless Enron shares.  This investment in Enron shares may be attributable to the 
accounting and tax incentives that reduced Enron's cost of pension contributions if it 
used its own shares, combined with the pension plan rules that limited employee sales 
of Enron-contributed shares until age fifty.  Therefore, employees pension funds were 
typically tied up in an undiversified portfolio. 
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Source:  
 Jeffrey N Gordon. (2002) What Enron means for the management and control of the 
modern business corporation: Some initial reflections, The University of Chicago 
Law Review. Vol. 69, Iss. 3: 1233-1250. 
 
Required: 
a) Why was there no adjustment in Enron’s share price when sophisticated 
investors knew of the complex financial structure. off-balance sheet entities, 
lack of disclosure, the lack of credibility of Andersen’s certification, and loss 
of independence between the auditors and Enron?  Comment on the reasons 
why you think these factors were not impounded into the share price. 
b) Even though Enron had what appeared to be a board structure that satisfies the 
guidelines for good corporate governance, how did information asymmetry 
and the board’s culture add to the demise of Enron? 
c) As option grants increased, the executives of Enron, were confronted with two 
incentives: fraud, and risk-taking. Does this mean that there were no positive 
effects associated with share options? 
d) If employee share schemes are to continue as an incentive to motivate 
employees to increase firm value, what, if any, restrictions should be placed 
on them? 
e) Enron demonstrates that there are problems that cannot be solved, but can only 
be contained.   Imperfectly fashioned incentives and the lack of self-restraint 
contributed to the collapse of Enron. Comment on this statement.  Are there 
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any other poor corporate governance practices that have played a part in the 
collapse? 
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Appendix A: Best practice disclosure recommendations from the ASX 
 
Attachment B 
Disclosure 
Best practice recommendations 
 
1.1 Formalise and disclose the functions reserved to the board and those delegated to 
management. 
 
2.1 A majority of the board should be independent directors. 
2.2 The chairperson should be an independent director. 
2.3 The roles of chairperson and chief executive officer should not be exercised by the 
same individual. 
2.4 The board should establish a nomination committee. 
2.5 Provide the information indicated in Guide to reporting on Principle 2. 
 
3.1 Establish a code of conduct to guide the directors, the chief executive officer (or 
equivalent), the chief financial officer (or equivalent) and any other key executives as 
to: 
3.1.1 the practices necessary to maintain confidence in the company’s integrity 
3.1.2 the responsibility and accountability of individuals for reporting and 
investigating reports of unethical practices. 
3.2 Disclose the policy concerning trading in company securities by directors, officers 
and employees. 
3.3 Provide the information indicated in Guide to reporting on Principle 3. 
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4.1 Require the chief executive officer (or equivalent) and the chief financial officer 
(or equivalent) to state in writing to the board that the company’s financial reports 
present a true and fair view, in all material respects, of the company’s financial 
condition and operational results and are in accordance with relevant accounting 
standards. 
4.2 The board should establish an audit committee. 
4.3 Structure the audit committee so that it consists of: 
•only non-executive directors 
•a majority of independent directors 
•an independent chairperson, who is not chairperson of the board 
•at least three members. 
4.4 The audit committee should have a formal charter. 
4.5 Provide the information indicated in Guide to reporting on Principle 4. 
 
5.1 Establish written policies and procedures designed to ensure compliance with 
ASX 
Listing Rule disclosure requirements and to ensure accountability at a senior 
management level for that compliance. 
5.2 Provide the information indicated in Guide to reporting on Principle 5. 
 
6.1 Design and disclose a communications strategy to promote effective 
communication with shareholders and encourage effective participation at general 
meetings. 
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6.2 Request the external auditor to attend the annual general meeting and be available 
to answer shareholder questions about the conduct of the audit and content of the 
auditor’s report. 
 
7.1 The board or appropriate board committee should establish policies on risk 
oversight and management. 
7.2 The chief executive officer (or equivalent) and the chief financial officer (or 
equivalent) should state to the board in writing that: 
7.2.1 the statement given in accordance with best practice recommendation 4.1 (the 
integrity of financial statements) is founded on a sound system of risk management 
and internal compliance and control which implements the policies adopted by the 
board 
7.2.2 the company’s risk management and internal compliance and control system is 
operating efficiently and effectively in all material respects. 
7.3 Provide the information indicated in Guide to reporting on Principle 7. 
 
8.1 Disclose the process for performance evaluation of the board, its committees and 
individual directors, and key executives. 
 
9.1 Provide disclosure in relation to the company’s remuneration policies to enable 
investors to understand (i) the costs and benefits of those policies and (ii) the link 
between remuneration paid to directors and key executives and corporate 
performance. 
9.2 The board should establish a remuneration committee. 
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9.3 Clearly distinguish the structure of non-executive directors’ remuneration from 
that of executives. 
9.4 Ensure that payment of equity-based executive remuneration is made in 
accordance with thresholds set in plans approved by shareholders. 
9.5 Provide the information indicated in Guide to reporting on Principle 9. 
10.1 Establish and disclose a code of conduct to guide compliance with legal and 
other obligations to legitimate stakeholders. 
Source: ASX Guidance Note 9A, ‘Corporate Governance - Principles & 
Recommendations’, pp. 24 and 25. 
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Glossary 
Adverse selection: the principal makes an inappropriate selection among alternatives.   
Board monitoring: an internal corporate governance control where the role of the 
board of directors is to monitor the performance of the organisation and the 
management of the organisation. 
Corporate governance: the method by which an organization is governed, 
administered, directed or controlled and to the goals for which it is governed 
Corporate Governance Council (CGC): a council consisting of 21 parties interested 
in improving the corporate governance practices and reporting of Australian business. 
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Corporate governance principles: guidelines for the efficient governance of 
Australian business. 
Corporate governance practice: the process employed by the organization to ensure 
the organisation is efficiently managed. 
Convex payoff:  benefits increase and decrease along a curved line 
Executive directors: member of the board of directors who are also employees of the 
organisation. 
External corporate governance controls: mechanisms external stakeholders 
exercise over the organisation that monitor and control the activities of employees. 
Information asymmetry:  the manager has private information about the firm that 
the owner is not aware of. 
Internal corporate governance controls: in-house mechanisms that monitor and 
control the activities of employees.   
Linear payoff: benefits increase and decrease along a straight line. 
Moral hazard: the manager does not comply with the contractual terms. 
Non-executive directors: independent members of the board of directors.  
Performance based remuneration: remuneration which is designed to relate some 
proportion of salary to individual performance within the context of overall company 
performance. 
Remuneration committee: An organisational committee with the principal role of 
setting executive compensation packages. 
Management share ownership: an internal control designed to ensure the shares 
owned by management motivate managers to act in the best interest of shareholders. 
Share options: the right to buy a share in the future at the price of the option at grant 
date. 
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Stakeholders: parties with interests in the organisation such as employees, 
shareholders and creditors.  
